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diff --git a/doc/security.rst b/doc/security.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f61e241b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/security.rst @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +.. _security: + +============== +Kolla Security +============== + +Non Root containers +=================== +The OpenStack services, with a few exceptions, run as non root inside of Kolla's +containers. Kolla uses the Docker provided USER flag to set the appropriate +user for each serivce. + +SELinux +======= +The state of SELinux in Kolla is a work in progress. The short answer is you +must disable it until selinux polices are written for the Docker containers. + +To understand why Kolla needs to set certain selinux policies for services that +you wouldn't expect to need them (rabbitmq, mariadb, glance, etc.) we must take +a step back and talk about Docker. + +Docker has not had the concept of persistent containerized data until recently. +This means when a container is run the data it creates is destroyed when the +container goes away, which is obviously no good in the case of upgrades. + +It was suggested data containers could solve this issue by only holding data if +they were never recreated, leading to a scary state where you could lose access +to your data if the wrong command was executed. The real answer to this problem +came in Docker 1.9 with the introduction of named volumes. You could now +address volumes directly by name removing the need for so called **data +containers** all together. + +Another solution to the persistent data issue is to use a host bind mount which +involves making, for sake of example, host directory ``var/lib/mysql`` available +inside the container at ``var/lib/mysql``. This absolutely solves the problem of +persistent data, but it introduces another security issue, permissions. With +this host bind mount solution the data in ``var/lib/mysql`` will be owned by the +mysql user in the container. Unfortunately, that mysql user in the container +could have any UID/GID and thats who will own the data outside the container +introducing a potential security risk. Additionally, this method dirties the +host and requires host permissions to the directories to bind mount. + +The solution Kolla chose is named volumes. + +Why does this matter in the case of selinux? Kolla does not run the process it +is launching as root in most cases. So glance-api is run as the glance user, +and mariadb is run as the mysql user, and so on. When mounting a named volume +in the location that the persistent data will be stored it will be owned by the +root user and group. The mysql user has no permissions to write to this folder +now. What Kolla does is allow a select few commands to be run with sudo as the +mysql user. This allows the mysql user to chown a specific, explicit directory +and store its data in a named volume without the security risk and other +downsides of host bind mounts. The downside to this is selinux blocks those +sudo commands and it will do so until we make explicit policies to allow those +operations. |
